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COMMON LAW EQUITY IN A CIVIL 
LAW COUNTRY 
AH Angelo* and Ashleigh Allan** 
This article serves to introduce an aspect of current research related to the review of the Seychelles 
Civil Code and the important question of the role of trusts. The Civil Code is based on the Code 
Napoléon and has therefore no provision for the trust of English law. The Courts of Seychelles have, 
however, a statutory equitable jurisdiction. That jurisdiction has given rise to the question whether 
the trust of England may be able to operate in Seychelles. The prime area of discussion of this 
possibility has been in relation to the property rights of the parties to a failed concubinage 
relationship. This article focuses on that discussion.  
I INTRODUCTION 
The story for Seychelles began in 1810. Seychelles was till then part of the French Empire. 
After the capitulation of the French forces in Mauritius,1 Seychelles as part of Mauritius began a 
new life as the British colony of Mauritius. As part of the protection for the "Religion, Laws, and 
Customs" guaranteed by the Capitulation,2 the Code Napoléon was retained.3 The years that 
followed 1810 saw the development of the inter-relationship of the French law with the Common 
Law of the colonial administration and its judicial system.  
  
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
**  BA/LLB(Hons), Barrister and Solicitor of the High Court of New Zealand, Law Researcher. 
1  The capitulation took place in 1810. The military government of the British continued till 1815 in 
accordance with the terms of the Capitulation. British sovereignty was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris 
1814 and implemented in Mauritius by Proclamation in 1815. That Proclamation confirmed that the French 
laws of Mauritius were to continue "in their full force and vigour".  
2  Acte de Capitulation, art 8: "Que les habitans conserveront leurs Religion, Loix, et Coutumes" as 
reproduced in Les Constitutions de l'Ile Maurice (Mauritius Printing Co Ltd, Port-Louis, 1962) at 79.  
3  It had been extended to Mauritius by Arrêté of 1808. 
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The basic provision for any Chancery-like jurisdiction of the courts of Seychelles is s 6 of the 
Courts Act:4  
The Supreme Court shall continue to be a Court of Equity and is hereby invested with powers, authority, 
and jurisdiction to administer justice and do all acts for the due execution of such equitable jurisdiction 
in all cases where no sufficient legal remedy is provided by the law of Seychelles. 
This article considers the parameters of this section and whether it can be used by the courts of 
Seychelles to introduce the Common Law trust. Part II considers the continuing judicial debate on 
this question in the context of property rights of parties to a failed concubinage5 relationship. Part 
III discusses references to trusts in Seychelles legislation and how the courts may interpret them. 
Part IV supports the commonly held view that the Common Law trust could not operate as such 
within the conceptual framework provided for property by the Civil Code of Seychelles.    
II WHAT THE CASES SAY 
Section 6 of the Courts Act has in practice generally been limited to procedural matters and 
remedies and the courts have consistently denied that s 6 could support the application of the 
substantive rules of the trust.   
There have been exchanges between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal on the scope of 
s 6 of the Courts Act. These exchanges have arisen in the context particularly of property between 
partners to a relationship of concubinage when their relationship has broken down. Relationships of 
concubinage are common in the Seychelles.6 The Matrimonial Causes Act provides for distribution 
of property upon marriage breakdown,7 but there is no comparable legislation for relationships of 
concubinage. This has required the courts to consider how the laws of Seychelles can assist 
concubins in this situation, invoking consideration of the role the equitable jurisdiction might play. 
Notwithstanding the social statistic, the cultural and religious focus is very clearly on marriage. A 
consequence of this is that the social hardship created for relationships of concubinage by the 
  
4  The original provision was s 7 of the Seychelles Judicature Order in Council 1903. It was incorporated into 
local legislation in s 5 of the Courts Ordinance Cap 43 (1964). See for a similar colonial precedent the New 
Zealand provision in s 16 of the Judicature Act 1908, confirming the equitable jurisdiction of the High 
Court of New Zealand as set out in s 5 of the Supreme Court Act 1860. 
5  The technical French term for the situation of a man and woman living together as man and wife. 
Commonly in Seychelles referred to as living en ménage. In New Zealand law they are de factos. 
6  The Population and Housing Census 2010 shows 24.6 per cent married couples and 19.3 per cent 
cohabitating but unmarried couples. 
7  See Matrimonial Causes Act, s 20(1)(g): The Court may:  
make such orders, as the Court thinks fit, in respect of any property of a party to a marriage or any 
interest or right of a party in any property for the benefit of the other party or a relevant child.   
 The regime is one of separation of property. 
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current law has not been addressed by legislation. The current Civil Code review project will 
address the matter because of its social impact and because of the equality provisions entrenched in 
the Constitution. The matter may well be addressed in legislation relating to property rights or social 
protection, rather than by reference to the law on matrimonial property.  
A convenient starting-point for a consideration of the equitable jurisdiction enquiry is the 
judgment of Sauzier J in Hallock v d'Offay.8 The parties lived in concubinage for 27 years. The 
respondent separated from the appellant, leaving her in a house with their two sons. The house was 
on a plot of land registered in the name of the respondent. The respondent brought an action against 
his two sons, claiming possession of the house and land, and an injunction restraining the defendants 
from resisting his occupation. The appellant intervened in the suit and sought a declaration that she 
had a share in the house and land. The respondent offered to give the appellant a share in the house 
and land, but the parties could not agree on the value of the shares. The Supreme Court found that 
the appellant was not entitled to any share in the respondent's house and land under the principles of 
unjust enrichment9 or société de fait.10  
The salient features of the unjust enrichment claim are that the claimant has suffered a 
detriment, that the defendant has enjoyed a benefit, that the detriment and the benefit are linked, and 
that there is no legal basis for the benefit enjoyed by the defendant (for example the benefit did not 
flow from a sale or a gift). The action in unjust enrichment is a default action; it can be used only 
where there is no other remedy available for the detriment the claimant has suffered. A successful 
claimant will be awarded a monetary sum equal to the lesser of the detriment suffered and the 
benefit gained. By comparison with the declaration of a constructive trust in the common law in a 
situation similar to that of those in a broken de facto relationship, the successful claimant has no 
right in specific property and essentially is left with a debt claim. This is again different from the 
law relating to parties to a dissolved marriage who in Seychelles, by virtue of legislation, can have 
orders made in respect of specific property.  
  
8  Hallock v d'Offay (1983-1987) 3 SCAR (Vol I) 295. 
9  Article 1381–1 of the Civil Code of Seychelles:  
If a person suffers some detriment without lawful cause and another is correspondingly enriched 
without lawful cause, the former shall be able to recover what is due to him to the extent of the 
enrichment of the latter. Provided that this action for unjust enrichment shall only be admissible if 
the person suffering the detriment cannot avail himself of another action in contract, or quasi-
contract, delict or quasi-delict; provided also that detriment has not been caused by the fault of the 
person suffering it. 
10  The concept of a société de fait distinguishes a commercial relationship from a social one (an association). 
This presumes the parties were in a relationship concerning property with an intention to advance a common 
interest and to share in the profits and losses involved. Maintaining a private life together would not 
constitute a société de fait for the purposes of property division. 
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On appeal from the decision in Hallock v d'Offay, the Court of Appeal11 upheld the Supreme 
Court's findings and the appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the 
appellant's alternative argument that the English doctrine of constructive trusts should apply 
because:12 
it is generally accepted that the law of trusts has no place in Seychelles, so that any attempt to equate 
man and mistress with husband and wife on the basis of a constructive trust seems doomed to fail.  
Eric Law and Goburdhun JJA suggested legislative change to protect the interests of 
concubins.13 In Sauzier J's often cited dissenting judgment, he supported the appellant's argument 
that the Supreme Court could use the wide equitable powers under the Courts Act to administer 
justice by equitably distributing property where a relationship of concubinage had broken down, as 
no sufficient legal remedy is provided by the law of Seychelles.14 He considered the current 
remedies (société de fait, action de in rem verso, and enforcement of a civil obligation) inadequate 
and that if the courts declined to use the equitable powers in this situation there would be a denial of 
justice.15 His judgment gives guidelines for the use of the equitable powers; the equitable powers 
were in addition to and not in derogation of the other powers of French law.16  
Shortly after deciding Hallock v d'Offay, the Court of Appeal again considered the place of 
trusts and Equity in Seychelles law in Monthy v Esparon.17 The parties had lived in concubinage for 
15 years. The respondent claimed a share in the house and shop on land owned by the appellant, as 
she had helped to run the shop. The Supreme Court18 had relied on the English case law on 
constructive trusts to make an order granting the respondent a share of the property. The Court of 
Appeal was divided. On the issue of trusts, Mustafa P said:19    
  
11  The final court of appeal in Seychelles. 
12  Hallock v d'Offay, above n 8, at 301, 305 and 313. 
13  At 301 and 305. 
14  At 314. 
15  At 315. 
16  At 317. 
17  Monthy v Esparon (1983-1987) 3 SCAR (Vol II) 12. 
18  At first instance and prior to Hallock v d'Offay's being decided in the Court of Appeal.  
19  At 19. Article 1371 of the Civil Code of Seychelles states:  
Quasi-contracts result from purely voluntary acts of a person. They give rise to duties towards a 
third party and sometimes to mutual obligations between two parties. 
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I doubt if the judge was right to rely on the principle of constructive trust in making the award. I would 
prefer to base my decision on the fact of a de facto partnership somewhat in terms of the provisions of 
article 1371 of the Civil Code of Seychelles.  
Eric Law J did not comment specifically on the Supreme Court's use of the constructive trust, 
and queried whether unjust enrichment (which had been pleaded) could be applicable in this case. 
Nevertheless he found compensation could be awarded to the respondent based on the principle of 
Dora's case that where a concubine renders services additional to those normally rendered by a 
concubine, the concubine is entitled to recover for lost salary.20 Sauzier J reiterated the comments 
he had made in Hallock v d'Offay: the Supreme Court should not have relied on constructive trusts 
to make the orders, as "[t]he English law of trusts does not apply in Seychelles and there is no need 
to refer to the technical and limitative principles of such law".21 Because no remedy was available in 
Seychelles law (société de fait, unjust enrichment, or the enforcement of a civil obligation), "[t]he 
learned trial Judge was entitled to use the powers under s [6] of the Courts Act to rectify the 
situation".22  
For a number of years after these decisions Sauzier J's comments were largely disregarded in 
case law. The judgments on concubinage and the division of property applied the principles of 
unjust enrichment and quasi-contract strictly, and were silent on the place of Equity. In Dodin v 
Malvina,23 the Supreme Court surveyed the authorities and expressly disagreed with Sauzier J's 
dicta on the court's equitable powers.  
The 1998 Court of Appeal decision of Vel v Knowles provided an opportunity for a 
reconsideration of Sauzier J's dissenting comments.24 The parties lived in concubinage for more 
than 17 years. The appellant was the registered owner of land, the funds for which were provided by 
the respondent. The appellant obtained a loan to build a house on the land, and the respondent made 
substantial financial and building contributions to the house. The appellant sought possession of the 
house and a declaration that she was the owner of the house and land. The Court of Appeal stated 
that: "The jurisprudence in Seychelles has evolved in an equitable way to provide relief for parties 
who live in concubinage."25 The Court further said that despite Dodin v Malvina:26  
  
20  See Dora v Curator of Vacant Estates (1963) SLR 66.  
21  At 27. 
22  At 28. 
23  Dodin v Malvina (1990) SLR 288. 
24  Vel v Knowles SCA 41/1998, 42/1998, LC 136, 13 August 1998. 
25  At 5. 
26  At 5–6.  
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… in view of the readiness of the Courts to provide relief for "unjust enrichment" it is likely, on 
occasion arising, for the Courts to reconsider the reasoning of Sauzier J in his dissenting judgment in the 
Hallock v d'Offay case … 
The respondent was granted a right of retention and compensation based on art 555 of the Civil 
Code27 and the applicant was denied possession of the house. 
Again for a number of years the courts considered concubinage separation cases without 
referring to Equity. In the March 2012 decision of Magnan v Desaubin,28 the Supreme Court 
considered a case where the parties had lived together in concubinage for 35 years in a house built 
by the defendant on land owned solely by the plaintiff. The parties separated and the plaintiff sought 
orders to evict the defendant from the house, to exclude the defendant from the property, and a 
declaration that the defendant had no claim in the house. The Court noted that concubinage creates 
no legal rights and that relief can be obtained only on the basis of unjust enrichment under art 1381–
1 of the Civil Code, and that could not be made out in this case. The application was allowed under 
art 555 of the Civil Code following Vel v Knowles, the Court finding that parties in concubinage are 
entitled to relief under art 555 of the Civil Code if the conditions set out in that article are fulfilled. 
At the end of the judgment, the Supreme Court indicated support for a wide interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's equitable powers:29 
I hasten to add that even if article 555 of CCS may not be applicable it would be sufficient to ground this 
decision in the doctrines of equity as it would be inequitable for the plaintiff to evict the defendant 
without compensation for the improved value that the defendant has brought to this property with the 
permission and consent of the plaintiff. 
In Monthy v Esparon, the parties jointly purchased a house and lived in concubinage for three 
years until the relationship ended.30 The Court of Appeal began by commending Sauzier J's use of 
equity in Hallock v d'Offay:31 
Sauzier J in his landmark decision of Hallock v d'Offay (1988) 3 SCAR 295 attempted to bring justice to 
the situation even when the property was not held in joint ownership. A shame it was that his was a 
dissenting judgment.  
  
27  Article 555 of the Civil Code of Seychelles regulates the situation where one person builds on another's 
land. The owner of the land can require the removal of the structures, or may elect to retain the structures on 
paying the third party either the increased value of the land or the cost of the materials and labour. 
28  Magnan v Desaubin SSC 1/2011, CM3 9, 29 March 2012. 
29  At [22]. 
30  Monthy v Esparon SCA 29/2010, CM3 16, 13 April 2012. Note the parties are different from the parties in 
Monthy v Esparon, above n 17. 
31  At [3]. 
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The Court of Appeal quashed the Supreme Court's judgment, which had ordered that the 
plaintiff was entitled to sole ownership of the property and that the defendant was entitled to 
compensation from the plaintiff in settlement of the defendant's share in the property. The Court of 
Appeal held that s 6 of the Courts Act provides that Equity is available only when no other legal 
remedy is available. The Court indicated three options available under the Civil Code for a joint 
owner who did not wish to remain in indivision. As the plaint was not an action based on any of 
those options, but on Equity alone, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge had acted ultra vires by 
making a property division order. The Court ordered the Registrar of Lands to restore ownership of 
the property to both parties and the respondent to pay the appellant damages and compensation. 
Whilst the Court of Appeal cited Sauzier J's dissenting judgment with approval,32 the effect of this 
judgment is to restrict Equity to situations where there is no other cause of action. Equity will rarely 
if ever be available for concubins seeking property division orders, as in most cases an alternative 
remedy can be found in unjust enrichment or quasi-contract.  
A few months later, in a matrimonial property decision, the Supreme Court in Chetty v Lepere 
seemingly responded to the above Court of Appeal decision.33 The ex-wife claimed the ex-
husband's half share in land be transferred to her, so that she could have sole ownership. The 
petition was dismissed in limine, because the Matrimonial Causes Rules had not been complied 
with, and because there was insufficient evidence. At the end of the judgment, the Court noted 
obiter that if the judgment were appealed the declaration should not be found ultra petita, as the 
Court had an unfettered discretion to make an order under s 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act,34 and:35 
It is also pertinent to note that this Court has jurisdiction to make any order as it thinks fit, in relation to 
matrimonial properties in exercise of its equitable powers conferred by section 6 of the Courts Act, in 
the interest of justice, irrespective of the fact, whether the issues were alive before the Court or not in 
respect of any determination it makes in relation to those properties. 
These comments were restated by the Supreme Court in Dijoux v Dijoux,36 another matrimonial 
property decision. The petitioner sought a declaration that the land and matrimonial home registered 
in the parties' joint names belonged to both in equal shares, and an order that the respondent 
compensate him for his half share so the respondent could become the sole owner. The Supreme 
  
32  It is to be noted that art 5 of the Civil Code of Seychelles provides: "Judicial decisions shall not be 
absolutely binding upon a Court but shall enjoy a high persuasive authority from which a Court shall only 
depart for good reason."   
33  Chetty v Lepere SSC 127/2007, 30 July 2012. 
34  See above n 7. 
35  At 4–5. 
36  Dijoux v Dijoux SSC 49/2005, 30 January 2013. 
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Court cited case law to the effect that the court may use its equitable powers under s 6 of the Courts 
Act, in addition to jurisdiction from statute,37 to make property orders in the interest of justice.38 
The Court attributed the shares of the property based on the parties' financial contributions to the 
house – 80 per cent to the respondent and 20 per cent to the petitioner. The Court then determined 
that the respondent was entitled to sole ownership of the property and the petitioner entitled to 
compensation, based on an equitable analysis similar to that carried out by the Supreme Court in 
Esparon v Monthy.39  
These exchanges suggest that the Supreme Court is willing to extend the equitable jurisdiction 
to do justice, while the Court of Appeal limits remedies available to  persons in concubinage 
relationships to those in the Civil Code and particularly to those relating to quasi-contract and unjust 
enrichment.  
The different approaches can be explained by different interpretations of the phrase "where no 
sufficient legal remedy is provided by the law of Seychelles" in s 6 of the Courts Act. Sauzier J took 
a broad view that the current remedies used to protect concubins were never intended to do this and 
they are inadequate. This thinking is reflected in the recent Supreme Court decisions. The Court of 
Appeal has adopted the narrower interpretation that the court is precluded from using s 6 when any 
remedy is available. There may however be cases where quasi-contract, unjust enrichment or art 555 
cannot be made out and the Court of Appeal will use s 6 to provide an equitable solution.  
The current approach of the Court of Appeal would suggest that s 6 allows the exercise of an 
equitable jurisdiction of a French style40 and the acceptance of English equitable measures such as 
injunction, but excludes the introduction of any substantive provisions from Equity. 
III THE TRUST IN LEGISLATION  
Also part of the legal scene, but not considered in the context of s 6, are references to the trust in 
bankruptcy and companies legislation,41 the offshore trust legislation,42 and in an increasing number 
  
37  See for example Matrimonial Causes Act, s 20(1)(g). See above n 7. 
38  See Mathiot v Mathiot SSC 105/1994; Florentine v Florentine SCA 4/1990, 12 April 1991; Renaud v 
Renaud SCA 48/1998, 22 April 1999. 
39  But subsequently quashed by the Court of Appeal. See Esparon v Monthy SSC 436/1998, 7 October 2010; 
Monthy v Esparon, above n 30. 
40  The Equity of England is different from the equité of French law. Equité is a notion of limited import 
(because it runs counter to notions of certainty in the law and the separation of powers between judge and 
legislator). It can, particularly in family law matters, have a corrective function in relation to the strict 
application of the law; in other areas it may supplement the law. 
41  Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Companies Ordinance. Both of British colonial origin.  
42  International Trusts Act. Without domestic operation and probably not a Common Law trust. Compare 
Maurizio Lupoi Trusts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) at 264.  
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of other Acts in the commercial law field (which have been drafted based on international 
precedents).43 From the context, it is clear that the drafter (though not the Seychelles legislator) was 
thinking of the English Common Law trust. There is no known litigation on the meaning of trust in 
these specific commercial contexts. What meaning a court might give to the provisions is unclear. A 
court might treat them as giving rise to a fiduciary duty and, in some cases, to statutory challenges 
and criminal sanctions. Alternatively a court might ignore the reference to trust in these Acts as 
drafting errors or oversights, or translate the reference to the Seychelles legal context by interpreting 
trustee to mean fiduciary.44 The Seychelles judges, who have mostly been trained in the English 
Common Law and therefore have a non-French law background, may take the word trust in the 
mixed jurisdiction to mean what it says and interpret trust as an English trust. 
IV THE TRUST AND THE CIVIL CODE 
The question is whether the Civil Code system supports the introduction of the Common Law 
trust. If the courts adopted a wide interpretation of the equitable powers in s 6 in a concubinage 
situation, or if the courts interpreted references to the trust in legislation to mean the English 
Common Law trust, the result may be stalemate – there is no legal infrastructure to support a trust-
based judgment. 
The Civil Code is the common law (droit commun) of the system. The result is that whereas a 
New Zealand or English lawyer goes back to precedent for core principle, lawyers in the French 
tradition find the core principles in the Civil Code.  
In the field of property, the system is one of clausus numerus – the only types of property known 
to the system are those enumerated in the Code. There can be horizontal splitting of ownership of a 
  
43  For example the use of the word trust is referred to in the Merchant Shipping Act, the Limited Partnerships 
Act 2003, the Trade Marks Decree, the Registration of Business Names Act, the Status of Married Women 
Act, the Securities Act 2007, and the International Business Companies Act. Another example is the use of 
"real" and "personal" in respect of property (for example the Seychelles Investment Act 2010). These are 
readily seen as synonyms for immovable and movable, though at the level of detail there may be 
differences.  
Other examples of Common Law ideas in Seychelles legislation are provided by references to consideration 
for contracts, though in the Code there is no requirement of consideration (for example the Excise Tax Act 
2009, the Foundations Act 2009, and the Seychelles Petroleum (Taxation) Act 2008). The Common Law 
conceptualisation makes it necessary to have separate rules for gifts and for third party benefits. In the Code 
system both of these are covered by the general rules of contract. The references to consideration may be 
seen as a drafting aberration. Some Code contracts do require exchange of value (for example sales, transfer 
of land, and the rules relating to lésion). These statutes will likely be read as imposing a value criterion in 
respect of the particular property transaction that is, no change in the basic conceptualisation of contract or 
in the underlying principles of the system. 
44  That is no split of ownership – the fiduciary is by statute the full owner with fiduciary duties for example to 
the bankrupt's creditors and to the bankrupt. See arts 815-835 of the Civil Code of Seychelles. 
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property right; there is no vertical splitting45 because inter alia there was no history of a Court of 
Chancery. 
The Civil Code system can provide for an in rem action by a beneficiary against a third party 
acquirer from a fiduciary. This is by way of exception to the general principle of l'apparence46 and 
of the indivisibility of rights.47 Fiduciary duties are created by contract or by statute.48 The ability to 
follow property – an in rem action as distinct from an in personam action – depends on notice given 
by registration or implied from the nature of the relationship.49 
The Code system generally favours creditors of the fiduciary and the security of transactions. 
The underlying principle is that of l'apparence and an aversion to secrecy. In order to protect a 
beneficial interest against the world at large publicity is needed.50 
  
45  The property right with an owner at law and an owner in equity. See FH Lawson, AE Anton, L Neville 
Brown (eds) Amos and Walton's Introduction to French Law (Oxford University Press, London, 1967) at 
99: 
There can be no distinction between legal and equitable estates. Either a person is owner or he is 
not; he cannot be owner for management purposes without also being owner for purposes of 
enjoyment. In this sense the unity of ownership is a fundamental principle of French law. It makes 
the peculiar English technique of the trust impossible. 
46  See Encyclopédie Dalloz "Civil" Vo "Apparence" May 2009 at [11]–[15]. This provides a rule of public 
policy which addresses a situation where the apparent legal condition does not represent the real legal 
position. It is what can be known to be the legal situation without the necessity of extensive research. It is a 
principle which can allow judges to give priority to the facts over the law.  
47 See Aubry et Rau Droit civil français vol IX at [574] as cited in Christian de Wulf The Trust and 
Corresponding Institutions in the Civil Law (Etablissements Emile Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1965) at 117:  
Le patrimoine est, en principe, un et indivisible comme la personnalité meme, non seulement … en 
ce que la meme personne ne peut posséder qu'un seul patrimoine, mais encore en ce sens que le 
patrimoine d'une personne n'est pas, à raison de sa nature incorporelle, divisible en parties 
matérielles ou de quantité, et n'est meme pas susceptible, à raison de l'unité de la personne, de se 
partager en plusieurs universalités juridiques, distinctes les unes des autres." [Patrimony is, in 
principle, one and indivisible as is personality itself, not only … in that one and the same person 
can have only one patrimony, but also in the sense that the patrimony of an individual is not, by 
reason by its incorporeal nature, divisible into physical parts or by way of quantity, and it cannot 
even be, because of the unity of the person, divided into several legal entities, which are distinct 
one from another.] 
Clear support for this is found in art 2092 of the Civil Code of Seychelles: "Whoever personally incurs an 
obligation shall be answerable with all his movable and immovable property, present or future, for its 
performance." 
48  For example, child and guardian. 
49  For example those dealing with a husband were on notice as to the existence of the possible protected rights 
of the wife as a secured creditor under the marital property regime. 
50  Somewhat analogous would be the situation were a trust to be written and registered.  
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On the other hand secrecy is a feature of the trust, and a trust can be created informally and 
orally. 
Literally s 6 is supplemental to substantive law. It does not suggest an alternative or new 
substantive law. For concubins there is substantive provision in the law on quasi-contract. A 
constructive trust cannot be an alternative or new answer to the need. The quasi-contract actions are 
in personam. A constructive trust if available would, in a Common Law country, provide a back-
dated property right and an in rem action. In the Seychelles situation it could give rise only to an in 
personam action. As to the quantum of relief available under each action, there may be little 
difference – the property value that A contributed to the property which is in B's name, as compared 
with the value of the property of A which has been transferred to B without legal basis.51   
At base a trust in Seychelles would have to be construed as a personal fiduciary relationship 
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary without any split in ownership or access by the 
beneficiary to the property by way of an in rem action. This is because the underlying principles of 
the system favour openness over secrecy and transparency of property ownership. The Code 
property regime with its emphasis on l'apparence and l'unité du patrimoine focuses on wider 
property interests52 and protection of transactions in the market place.53 By contrast virtues of trust 
are its secrecy and that it can and does deny apparent ownership.54  
The trust can be seen as selfish in the sense that it protects the settlor's wishes or interests in 
respect of the property. It reflects a focus on the settlor's ownership.  
The answer to the question of whether trusts can operate in Seychelles must be no55 – 
conceptually they do not work in the Civil Code system.56  
  
51  For example the transfer was not a sale or a gift by A to B. 
52  Compare the succession interests of the close family – which New Zealand seeks to deal with by the 
exceptional legislation of the Family Protection Act 1955. 
53  For example those dealing with the person whose name is on the ownership document are dealing with the 
full owner. The same principle is evident in art 2279 of the Civil Code of Seychelles: "With regard to 
movables, possession in good faith establishes a presumption of ownership." 
54  The Code admits an in rem action by a beneficiary as an exceptional matter where the holding of property 
by the fiduciary is a matter of public knowledge. 
55  Agreeing with A G Chloros Codification in a Mixed Jurisdiction (North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam, 1977) at 12:  
the English trust simply does now fit into the law… it would be unwise to assume as one may be 
tempted to do, that in Seychelles it is possible to create legal and equitable relationships. 
56  Declaration of a constructive trust as sometimes mooted would amount to a judicial property order of the 
kind made under s 20(1)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act  for marriage partners. There would be a direct 
transfer of ownership rather than a splitting of ownership.  
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The unity of a person's property holding is in effect the creditor's assurance of the debtor's 
substance. Exceptions to the rule in French law have been few and statutory. In 2007 after a long 
evolution, France introduced the fiducie into the Civil Code as arts 2011–2031. This addition to the 
Code was an attempt to provide a "trust" for France in order to stem the flight of investment capital 
to London. It is clear that the fiducie is not a trust. It is equally clear that the precise nature of the 
fiducie in the French legal framework is uncertain, as is the extent to which the basic concepts of 
property are affected by it.57 There is no statutory system for the trust in Seychelles; a fortiori a trust 
cannot operate in Seychelles.  
V CONCLUSION 
Seychelles' mixed jurisdiction provides an opportunity to consider the relationship between the 
Civil Law and the Common Law heritage and whether the English trust may fit into this. The courts 
of Seychelles may be tempted to use the equitable jurisdiction in s 6 of the Courts Act to protect the 
property rights of concubins or to interpret references to the trust in legislation as meaning the 
Common Law trust that judges are familiar with.  
If the courts interpreted the word trust to mean the English trust then s 6 of the Courts Act 
becomes less of an obstacle and more of a bridge between legal cultures and to the substantive 
addition of the trust. If however the Court can go so far as to interpret and apply trust as an English 
trust, there is no reason why the use of s 6 may not be thorough-going and include all the Chancery 
law. The result paradoxically would then be to confirm that the trust does not fit in the Civil Code 
regime because the Code is based on the principle that the person identified as owner is the full 
owner. 
  
57  For general discussion of these matters see M Grimaldi "Introduction of the Trust into French Law" (2011) 
2 Revue de droit Henri Capitant; L Bibaut "La fiducie face au trust" (22 June 2011) Le petit juriste 
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